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Abstract
Usingaudit trail data for a sample of NYSE ﬁrms we show that medium-size trades
are associated with a disproportionately large cumulative stock price change relative to
their proportion of all trades and volume. This result is consistent with the predictions
of Barclay and Warner’s (1993) stealth-tradinghypothesis. We ﬁnd that the source of
this disproportionately large cumulative price impact of medium-size trades is trades
initiated by institutions. This result is robust to various sensitivity checks. Our ﬁndings
appear to conﬁrm street lore that institutions are informed traders. # 2001 Elsevier
Science S.A. All rights reserved.
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Extant theoretical research posits that an investor with private information
will tend to trade gradually in order to proﬁt before his trades fully reveal the
information (see, for example, Kyle (1985) and Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988)).
1
Barclay et al. (1993) argue that if informed investors’ trades are the main cause
of stock price changes and informed traders concentrate their trades in trades
of certain sizes – not too large (which could give them away) and not too small
(too expensive in terms of tradingcosts) – then most of a stock’s cumulative
price change should take place on trades of medium-sizes. We would then
expect to see medium-size trades display a disproportionately large cumulative
price change relative to their overall proportion of trades and/or volume. This
is the ‘‘stealth-trading’’ hypothesis, whose validity is an empirical issue. Barclay
and Warner examine a sample of 108 tender oﬀers between 1981 and 1984 and
ﬁnd that medium-size trades (deﬁned as trades of 500–9,999 shares) account for
an estimated 92.8% of the cumulative price-change during the pre-tender oﬀer
announcement period. These, and related ﬁndings they report, support the
stealth-tradinghypothesis.
In an eﬀort to enrich our understandingof the stealth-tradinghypothesis, we
attempt to link the price impact of a trade of a speciﬁc size with whether the
trade was initiated by individual investors and institutions – the two main
investment groups. Our bifurcation of the sample is, in part, motivated by prior
research that indicates that these two investor groups may diﬀer in their level of
sophistication in response to information, with the implication beingthat
institutions are ‘‘smart,’’ or informed, traders.
2
To maximize the probability of detectingstealth-trading , we restrict
attention only to stocks in the data that displayed a signiﬁcant price increase
over the sample period. The intuition behind selectingstocks with sig niﬁcant
price increases is that any (possible) stealth-tradingactivity is likely to be
focused on one side of the market and can be detected by our tests. We do not
condition the sample on any particular information event.
Deﬁning a price change that occurs on a given trade as the diﬀerence
between the trade’s price and the price of the previous trade, we initially show
that medium-size trades are associated with the highest cumulative stock price
1Numerous other studies have also investigated the impact of trades on stock prices. See, for
example, Easley and O’Hara (1987, 1992a,b), Burdette and O’Hara (1987), Holthausen et al.
(1987), Ball and Finn (1989), Seppi (1990), Hasbrouck (1991a,b), Grossman (1992), Madhavan and
Smidt (1991, 1993), Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995), Huangand Stoll (1994), Bertsimas and Lo
(1996) and Keim and Madhavan (1996).
2See Arbel and Strebel (1983), Bhusan (1989), Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Hand (1990),
Lee (1992), Meulbroek (1992), Cornell and Sirri (1992), Badrinath et al. (1995), Sias and Starks
(1997), Chakravarty and McConnell (1997, 1999), Walther (1997) and Koski and Scruggs (1998).
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prediction of the stealth-tradinghypothesis.
Upon further decomposition of trades into those initiated by institutions and
by individuals, we ﬁnd that almost all of the 79% cumulative stock price
change is associated with medium-size trades initiated by institutions. Put
diﬀerently, medium-size institutional trades cause a disproportionately larger
proportion of cumulative price change than would be warranted based either
on their proportion of all trades or on their proportion of the total volume.
Our results appear to conﬁrm that the root of stealth-tradinglies in trades by
institutions, one implication of which is that institutions are informed traders.
We also perform several sensitivity checks to ensure the robustness of our
results. Notable among them is the recognition, and control, for larger
medium-size institutional trades relative to medium-size individual trades. The
signiﬁcantly large contribution of medium-size institutional trades to the
overall disproportionately large cumulative price impact of medium-size
trades, is also evident throughout the universe of stocks in our data set. The
evidence, however, is relatively stronger in large ﬁrms.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 provides details
of the data, includingsample selection and classiﬁcation of trades. Section 3
provides the analyses. Section 4 provides sensitivity checks. Section 5
concludes.
2. Data and classiﬁcation procedures
Almost all publicly available data restrict the nature and quality of
inferences that can be made about the origin of the orders behind the reported
trades. But, the TORQ data that we use in our analysis contain information on
trades, quotes, order processing, and audit trails for a size-stratiﬁed random
sample of NYSE stocks, for the three-month period of November 1990
through January 1991 (63 trading days). The selection process ensures that the
stocks in the sample are representative of the population of all NYSE stocks.
Hasbrouck (1992) provides other relevant details on this process. The
usefulness/representativeness of the TORQ data is evident in its widespread
use in previous research such as Hasbrouck (1996), Sias and Starks (1997),
Koski and Scruggs (1998), Angel (1998), Chung et al. (1999) and Ready (1999).
The data consist of four ﬁles: (1) the consolidated trade ﬁle, (2) the
consolidated quote ﬁle, (3) the system order database (SOD) ﬁle, and (4) the
consolidated audit ﬁle. The ﬁrst two, the trade and quote ﬁles, are essentially
similar to what is available through ISSM or TAQ data sets. It is the last two
ﬁles, particularly the audit ﬁle that makes the TORQ data set unique, and
is the one we use for the current analysis. The NYSE maintains the audit trail
records for surveillance and general management information purposes, and
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approximately 98%.
The audit ﬁle seeks to provide a detailed description of each trade, including
price, time, volume, and identities of the participants. The focus of this study is
the initiatingtrader of a transaction and the impact of that trade on price.
Initiatingtrades are, almost always, market orders. Yet, there are three ways in
which an initiatingorder can be a limit order. The ﬁrst, and most likely, case
occurs when the order happens to be a marketable limit order (which is like a
market order) or when limit orders cross inside the spread. Second, and less
likely, the limit order could be matched with a market order that has been
stopped, or the limit order appears the second after the market order and the
price of the limit order improves upon the existingquote. But it is debatable if
these transactions can be classiﬁed as beinginitiated by a limit order. Third,
and least likely, is if the specialist took the other side of a limit order, then the
limit order would be viewed as the trade initiator. We discuss identiﬁcation of
the trade initiator in Section 2.3.
The comprehensiveness of the audit ﬁle is achieved through a synthesis of a
variety of computerized and paper sources. For example, the Consolidated
Trade System contains price, time, and volume, but not trader identities (or
account-type information), and corresponds to orders from the following
sources: (1) SuperDOT (Digital Order Turnaround), the electronic order
submission system; (2) the OpeningAutomated Report System used at market
openings; and (3) the Intermarket Trading System (ITS) used to transfer orders
between market centers. The clearingrecords for the individual brokerag e
ﬁrms contain price, time, and account type information – but not necessarily an
accurate time stamp. Speciﬁcally, the account-type information is obtained as
follows. At the end of each trading day, any exchange member (brokerage ﬁrm)
submittinga trade is asked to furnish details about the trade. If the trade is
from the member itself for its personal account, it is classiﬁed as Account Type
P. It does not include trades by specialists. Inferringspecialist trades from
TORQ data is not easy. As conversations with exchange oﬃcials reveal, trades
by specialists have the correspondingaccount type and order type identiﬁers
stripped out of the TORQ data for conﬁdentiality purposes. Recently, Chung
et al. (1999) have attempted to measure how much of a quote reﬂects the
tradinginterest of the specialist, the limit order book or both. If a trade is from
an individual investor, the order is classiﬁed as Account Type I. Brokers are
encouraged to provide this information, so that their clients can receive
preferential routingthroug h the Individual Investor Express Delivery Service
(IIEDS). Finally, if a trade is from an institution, it is classiﬁed as Account
Type A. This could also include trades from the exchange member itself
representing another exchange member. However, discussions with exchange
oﬃcials indicate that a vast majority of trades under the A classiﬁcation are
non-exchange member institutional trades.
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from institutions, under the assumption that almost all exchange members are,
arguably, institutions. But, to ensure that our results are not an artifact of this
assumption, we replicate our analysis with only Account Type A trades as
institutional trades, and obtain virtually identical results.
While the reportingby the brokerag es on the Account Type variable is not
independently monitored, there is little reason to suspect broker misrepre-
sentation. As Radhakrishna (1994) reports, the total volume of individual
trades in the TORQ data is similar to the total volume of individual trades
estimated by Securities Industry Association (SIA) over the same time period.
The SIA estimation procedure is based on an independent data source, namely
the regulatory ﬁlings by institutional investors.
Although the audit ﬁle is the only publicly available data that can shed light
on the parties behind transactions, in determiningtheir relative impact on
prices, the data includes only orders submitted through the electronic routing
systems. Speciﬁcally, these SuperDOT orders can originate from terminals in
member ﬁrm’s branch oﬃces or from a customer’s oﬃce. Upon arrival,
SuperDOT orders appear on the screen of the specialist’s display book. If one
or both sides of a transaction are orders that have been hand-carried to the
specialist’s post by ﬂoor brokers, the audit trail information of such orders is
missing. The transaction-related information, however, is complete and
represents the entire scope of tradingactivities on the correspondingstocks.
2.1. Sample selection
To maximize the probability of detectingstealth-trading , we restrict
attention only to stocks in the data that displayed a signiﬁcant price increase
over the sample period. Barclay and Warner also initially restrict attention to a
sample of tender-oﬀer targets, which display abnormal price increases before
the initial tender-oﬀer announcement. The authors argue that some traders
may have valuable private information duringthe preannouncement period.
Our partitioningis in the same spirit. According ly, we select 97 stocks that had
at least a 5% price increase over the three-month period covered by the data.
The average price increase of the 97 stocks in our sample is 28% with a
maximum price increase of 124%. Since the market increase over the same
period was about 12%, the stocks in our sample represent a spectrum of
activity over and above the market increase. Any stealth-tradingactivity, if
present, is therefore likely to be detected by our tests.
It is, of course, theoretically possible that stocks displayinga sig niﬁcant
price decrease are also likely to have signiﬁcant insider activity (on the sell
side) and should display evidence of stealth-trading. In reality, however,
insider sales are more restrictive than insider purchases. For example, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits corporate insiders from short selling.
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they were, if the direction of their trades would necessarily be informative.
Additionally, the TORQ data are limited in the number of stocks with a
signiﬁcant price decrease over the sample period. Speciﬁcally, only 14 stocks
display a price decrease of 5% or more, over the sample period, and most of
these appear to be relatively thinly traded. Thus, the reliability of any
conclusions made from analyzingsuch stocks is questionable. Investig ating
stocks showinglittle or no price chang es over the sample period is also
problematic. Such stocks probably have informed tradingactivities on both
sides of the market, and it is diﬃcult to reliably estimate stealth-tradingin
those cases.
2.2. Identifying individual and institutional trades
To attribute the price response to an order with certain characteristics, we
need to establish that such orders are, at least partially, identiﬁed by some
market participants, includingthe market maker. In our case, these
characteristics involve the identiﬁcation of whether an order originated from
an individual investor or an institutional client.
Aside from the basic features of an order necessary for its proper execution,
such as ticker symbol, buy/sell, market/limit, size, and price (if limit), the
market maker knows, or can deduce, further information about incoming
orders, especially if an order is from an institutional or a retail (individual)
investor, as they ﬂash on his computer screen. For example, the size of an order
itself can sometimes provide important clues. Larger orders are more likely to
be from institutions than individuals. If a market maker is curious about the
origin of an order, he can go to a special screen on his monitor that provides
him with certain mnemonics through which he may identify the submitting
broker’s identity. Over time, specialists believe they can recognize patterns in
trades associated with certain mnemonics and, in turn, deduce the trader type
behind an order.
3 In sum, all evidence points to the probability that market
makers are able to deduce the trader type submittingthe order, should they be
interested.
A practical reason for market makers wantingto keep track of who is behind
an order is that the trades of certain investors (or investor-groups) are followed
and mimicked by other investors. This is known as ‘‘follow-on trading’’ and
has been discussed by many researchers (see, for example, Barclay and Dunbar
(1996), Chakravarty and McConnell (1997, 1999) and Chakravarty and Sarkar
(1998)). Given that such practices can seriously jeopardize the proﬁts of market
makers, their self-preservation instinct itself will dictate their attemptingto
discover the identity behind certain trades. That way, they can proactively
3I thank Joel Hasbrouck for providingthese insig hts in private conversations.
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from adverse market conditions.
Finally, Hasbrouck (1996) assumes that market participants are able to
distinguish between program and non-program trades within the context of the
TORQ data. And, more relevant to us, Sias and Starks (1997, p. 109) use the
TORQ data to test if institutional holdings can eﬀectively proxy for
institutional trading– a procedure that requires the assumption that the
specialist is able to distinguish between individual and institutional trades.
2.3. Relationship between orders and trades
All publicly available transaction data sets suﬀer from two important
drawbacks that adversely aﬀect the current analysis. First, the reported
transactions do not have a one-to-one correspondence with the orders that
make up the transaction. This is an important distinction because, as
Bronfman (1992) reports, transactions data, such as those employed by
Barclay and Warner, do not always have a one-to-one correspondence with
individual orders. Thus, an 800-share transaction reported in the data could
represent a paringof a market buy order for 800 shares with two market sell
orders for 400 shares each. But the specialist could report this trade either as a
single transaction of 800 shares (a medium-size trade) or as two transactions of
400 shares each (small-size trades). This introduces noise in the system in trying
to determine the eﬀect of trade-size on price change. Second, the audit ﬁle in
TORQ does not identify whether the buyer or the seller in a transaction was the
trade initiator.
Since the market maker has the freedom to report a transaction in multiple
ways, absent a direct mappingbetween a trade and its underlyingorders, it is
unreliable to use transactions data directly to measure the eﬀect of trade size on
stock prices. The audit ﬁle of the TORQ data set, however, identiﬁes the
traders (and their order sizes) on either side of a transaction.
But, even with this correspondence between orders and transactions, the
initiatingorder side may have multiple parties involved in the trade. For
example, a 5,000-share buyer-initiated transaction may comprise of an
individual buyer for 2,000 shares and an institutional buyer for 3,000 shares,
matched with an institutional seller for 5,000 shares. This would make a
diﬃcult, if not impossible, task of identifyingwhose trades impacted the price
change. We overcome this hurdle by eliminating all transactions where the
active (or, initiating) side has less than 100% participation in any single trader
type. Thus, if the initiatingbuy side of a 20,000-share trade has four traders
each with a 5,000-share order, and if all four are institutional buyers, the
observation is included in our data. Usingthis ﬁlter, we are left with 151,367 (a
little over 60% of the initial) observations in the audit ﬁle in the 97 chosen
stocks. This is the sample used in the current study.
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stringent 90% and 75% and 50% cutoﬀ rules, successively. That is, we
eliminated all transactions where the initiatingside of a transaction has less
than 90%, 75% and 50% participation, respectively, in any speciﬁc trader-
group. Hence, if 15,000 shares (out of a 20,000-share, buyer-initiated, trade)
are from three institutional buyers and a 5,000-share order is from a single
individual buyer, then under the 75% cutoﬀ rule, we would still classify this
transaction as an institution-initiated trade. Usingthe 50% cutoﬀ rule (the
least stringent inclusion criterion), we retain over 80% of the initial
observations. The tradeoﬀ in usingprog ressively less (more) string ent cutoﬀ
rules is between includingmore (less) observations and introducingmore (less)
noise and, thereby, lowering(increasing ) the power of our tests to detect
stealth-trading. The results, through these successive iterations, however,
remain materially similar.
It is important to infer the initiator of a trade (buyer or seller) because all
extant theories of market microstructure, modelingthe impact of trades on
prices and other observables, are based on the trade initiator. O’Hara (1995)
provides a survey on this impact. Hence, the validity of all economic studies,
based on such theories, also hinges critically on the accurate classiﬁcation of
trades as buyer- or seller-initiated.
We use the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to classify trades as buyer- or
seller-initiated. Thus, if a trade occurs at the prevailingbid (ask) or anywhere
between the bid (ask) and the midpoint of the prevailingbid-ask spread, it is
considered a seller-initiated (buyer-initiated) trade. For trades occurringat the
prevailingspread midpoint, the tick test rule is applied to determine the trade
initiator, whereby a trade is buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) if the price move
from the previous transaction price is upwards (downwards). Also, the
prevailingspread is assumed to be at least ﬁve seconds old. Otherwise, the
previous quote is used to compute the prevailingspread.
Recently, Odders-White (1999) has proposed an alternative classiﬁcation
scheme whereby the initiator of a transaction is the investor (buyer or seller)
who placed his order last, chronologically. As a robustness check, we repeat
our analyses with this alternative classiﬁcation scheme to verify that our results
are not sensitive to the particular classiﬁcation scheme. The results are virtually
identical.
3. Analyses
In this section, our primary objective is to document how much of a
security’s cumulative price change over the sample period is attributable to
trades in each size category. Consistent with Barclay et al. (1993), we deﬁne
small-size trades as trades of 100–499 shares; medium-size trades as trades
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or greater.
3.1. Cumulative stock price changes and trade size
We test if the proportion of the cumulative price change associated with
trades in each size category is the same as the proportion of trades (and/or the
proportion of volume) in each category. If stealth-trading exists, we would
expect to see medium-size trades display a disproportionately larger proportion
of cumulative price change relative to their proportion of all trades (and
volume) in the sample. Alternatively, if the cumulative price change occurring
in trades in a given size category is directly proportional to the fraction of
transactions in that category, it would indicate that most stock price changes
are caused by the release of public information (the public information
hypothesis). Yet another alternative, followingfrom the idea that larg e trades
should move prices more than do small trades, is where the cumulative price
change in each trade-size category is proportional to the fraction of the total
tradingvolume in that categ ory (the tradingvolume hypothesis).
We deﬁne a price change that occurs on a given trade as the diﬀerence
between the trade’s price and the price of the previous transaction.
Correspondingto each trade in the audit ﬁle, the previous trade is identiﬁed
from the transactions ﬁle (by time and a unique identiﬁcation number that
links the two ﬁles) that lists all transactions in that stock.
Our method of computingthe cumulative stock price return follows Barclay
et al. (1993). For each of the 97 stocks, we sum all price changes that occur on
trades in a given trade size category over the sample of observations. We then
divide this sum by the cumulative price change for the stock over the sample.
Finally, we estimate the weighted cross-sectional mean of the cumulative stock
price change (over the 97 stocks) where the weights are the absolute value of
the cumulative price change in each stock over the sample.
For the cross-section of 97 stocks, Table 1 reports the mean percentage of
the cumulative stock price changes, the corresponding numbers and
percentages of trades, and the volume and volume percentages in each of the
three trade size categories.
From Table 1, most of the cumulative price change occurs in medium-size
trades. Trades in this category cause about 79% of the cumulative price change
in our sample and comprise 57% of the transactions and 47% of the volume.
The large-size trades cause about 25% of the cumulative price change and
comprise 6% of the transactions and 51% of the volume. The small-size trades
cause about 4% of the cumulative price change and comprise 36% of
transactions and 3% of the volume. Thus, medium-size trades appear to have a
disproportionately large role in the cumulative price change, relative to their
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Barclay and Warner and the predictions of the stealth-tradinghypothesis.
There also appears to be little support for the public information hypothesis.
Small trades cause about 4% of the cumulative price change but account for
36% of all trades, while large trades cause about 25% of the cumulative price
change but comprise only 6% of all trades in the sample. The hypothesis that
the percentage cumulative price change equals the percentage of trades is
rejected at the 1% level. The tradingvolume hypothesis also appears without
support. While the medium-size trades cause about 79% of the cumulative
price change and comprises 47% of the volume, the large-size trades cause
about 25% of the cumulative price change and comprises 51% by volume. The
hypothesis that the percentage cumulative price change equals the volume
percentage is rejected at the 1% level. We also use the non-parametric
Spearman rank correlation test between the cumulative price change in each
trade size category and the corresponding proportion of trades on a stock-by-
stock basis and ﬁnd that the correlation between the two is insigniﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level. The implication is that the cumulative price
changes in each trade size category and the corresponding proportion of trades
are randomly paired and not proportional to one another. Further, a
Spearman rank correlation test between the cumulative price change in each
trade size category and the corresponding proportion of volume ﬁnds that
the correlation between the two is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the
5% level.
Table 1
Cumulative price change, trades, and volume by trade sizes
The table provides the mean percentage of the cumulative stock price change, percentage of trades,
and percentage of share volume by trade size. Trade sizes are classiﬁed as small (100 to 499 shares),
medium (500 to 9,999 shares), and large (10,000+ shares). A stock price change corresponding to a
speciﬁc trade is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between that trade’s price and the price of the previous
trade. For each stock, the percentage of cumulative price change for a trade of a given size is the
sum of all stock price changes occurring on trades in that size category divided by the total
cumulative price change in that stock over the sample. The weighted cross-sectional mean of the
cumulative stock price change are then estimated and reported below where the weights are the
absolute value of the cumulative price change of each stock in the sample. The proportion of trade
(volume) is the sum of all transactions (volume), in a given size category, divided by the total
cumulative trade (volume) in the sample. The sample consists of 97 NYSE ﬁrms in the TORQ
database with signiﬁcant price increases between November 1, 1990 and January 31, 1991.








Small (100–499 shares) 3.86 55,129 36.42 10,973,600 2.81
Medium (500–9999 shares) 78.63 86,807 57.35 182,056,300 46.69
Large (10,000+shares) 25.23 9,431 6.23 196,913,600 50.50
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Table 2 presents descriptive data on the average percent of cumulative stock
price change for trades initiated by each trader group in each of the three trade
size categories, the corresponding number and percentage of trades, and the
volume and volume percentages. In estimating the percentages of cumulative
price run-up, the denominator is the cumulative price change on all trades of all
sizes in our sample. Well over 90% of the cumulative price run up takes place
in the trades we study. The computation of these variables is discussed in
Section 3.1. The discrepancy in the number of observations in each trade size
category, between Tables 1 and 2, is due to the fact that, in some observations,
whether the trade initiator is the buyer or the seller cannot be uniquely
determined. Hence, these observations cannot be classiﬁed as originating from
either individuals or institutions.
Large-size trades by institutions are associated with a cumulative price
change of about 23% of the total cumulative price change across all trade sizes
and trader types in our sample. In contrast, large-size individual trades are only
associated with about 1% cumulative price change, even though the average
individual and institutional trade sizes are roughly comparable at 19,000
(10,383,800/547) and 20,400 (158,856,300/7,797) shares, respectively.
The implication is that, relative to large-size individual trades, large
institutional trades are considered informed trades by the market, resulting
in their signiﬁcantly greater cumulative price impact.
More interestingly, however, medium-size trades initiated by institutions
cause the highest average cumulative price change, of about 79%, across all
trade sizes and trader types in our sample and comprise 40% of the trades and
38% of the volume. In contrast, medium-size trades initiated by individuals
cause an average cumulative price change of about 2%, and comprise 14% of
the trades and 7% of the volume.
Based on the evidence, stealth-tradingappears to be primarily driven by
medium-size trades initiated by institutions. Speciﬁcally, about 103% (3%) of
the cumulative price change associated with medium-size trades is attributable
to institutional (individual) trades.
4
A closer examination of the numbers in Table 2 also reveals that the average
medium-size individual trade is signiﬁcantly smaller than the average medium-
size institutional trade. The average medium-size institutional trade is about
2,424 shares (125,378,400/51,721) while the average medium-size individual
trade is about 1,358 shares (24,512,700/18,056) – and this diﬀerence (in
4We compute these numbers as follows. From Table 2, the sum of the magnitudes of the mean
percentage cumulative price change for medium-size trades from individuals and institutions is
77.17% (=79.16+(1.99)). The reported percentages are simply 102.57(=79.16(100/77.17))
and 2.57(=1.99(100/77.17)) for institutions and individuals, respectively.
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impact of medium-size trades by these two groups of traders needs to control
for the diﬀerence in trade sizes. We do so in three ways.
First, we decompose the medium trade size category into four sub-partitions
of trades sizes of 500–999 shares, 1,000–2,999 shares, 3,000–5,999 shares, and
6,000–9,999 shares. Statistical tests reveal that the average individual and
institutional trade sizes in each of these sub-categories is similar. Speciﬁcally, in
the 500–999 share category, the average individual and institutional trade sizes
are 726 shares and 778 shares, respectively. In the three remainingsub-
categories, the corresponding average individual and institutional trade sizes
are 1,900 shares and 2,065 shares; 4,563 shares and 4,631 shares; and 7,627
shares and 7,716 shares, respectively. Table 2 also provides the percentage of
Table 2
Cumulative price change, trades and volume by trade sizes and trader types
Trade sizes are classiﬁed as small (100–499 shares), medium (500–9,999 shares), and large
(10,000+shares). Trades are further identiﬁed as initiatingfrom individuals or institutions. The
medium trade size category is subdivided into four sub-categories of trade sizes. The table reports
the (cross-sectional) mean cumulative stock price change, the proportion of trades, and the
proportion of share volume, by trade size and, further, by trade initiator. Sample consists of 97
NYSE ﬁrms in the TORQ database with signiﬁcant price increases between November 1, 1990 and
January 31, 1991.








Trades initiated by individuals
Small (100–499 shares) 7.39 30,425 23.44 5,687,600 1.73
Medium (500–9,999 shares) 1.99 18,056 13.91 24,512,700 7.45
500–999 shares 0.965 12,235 9.425 8,877,000 2.697
1000–2,999 shares 4.824 4,362 3.360 8,286,100 2.518
3,000–5,999 shares 1.529 1,233 0.950 5,625,800 1.709
6,000–9,999 shares 0.338 226 0.174 1,723,800 0.524
Large (10,000+shares) 1.12 547 0.42 10,383,800 3.16
Trades initiated by institutions
Small (100–499 shares) 8.54 21,268 16.38 4,287,300 1.30
Medium (500–9,999 shares) 79.16 51,721 39.84 125,378,400 38.10
500–999 shares 29.943 20,609 15.876 16,023,800 4.869
1000–2,999 shares 21.207 17,199 13.249 35,518,800 10.793
3,000–5,999 shares 22.108 10,866 8.370 50,324,500 15.291
6,000–9,999 shares 5.900 3,047 2.347 23,511,300 7.144
Large (10,000+shares) 22.86 7,797 6.01 158,856,300 48.27
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volume and volume percentages, of each initiating trader type, for each of the
four medium trade size sub-categories discussed above.
Within each medium trade size sub-category, the average cumulative price
change associated with institutional trades is signiﬁcantly greater than that
associated with individual trades. For example, in the 500–999 share trade size
sub-category, the cumulative price change for institutional trades is about 30%
compared to about 1% for individual trades. The results in the remainingsub-
categories follow similarly.
Second, we investigate the distribution of transaction-by-transaction stock
price changes (in units of cents per 100 shares) for trades in various size
categories initiated by individuals and institutions. Table 3 presents the means
and standard deviations and the p-values of tests of equality of means across
individual and institutional trades in each size category. Both small and large-
size trades initiated by individuals display signiﬁcantly greater (and positive)
mean stock price impact per unit volume than institutional trades in the same
trade size category. But, more relevant for us, for all sub-categories of medium-
size trades, the average price impact of institutional trades is between two-and-
half times to over eight times greater than the average price impact of
individual trades. The diﬀerence between the averages in all sub-categories is
also statistically signiﬁcant at reasonable levels of conﬁdence. Thus, in the 500–
999 share category, for example, the average price impact of individual trades
is 0.009 cents versus 0.073 cents for institutional trades, each on a 100-share
basis. The remainingsub-categ ories follow similarly.
Third, we perform regressions on each of the 97 stocks in our sample,
where the dependent variable is the transaction-by-transaction price change
per unit volume and the independent variables are the lagged dependent
variable, and six dummy variables to capture the small, medium, and large-size
trades of institutions and individuals. The dependent variable, deﬁned on an
unit volume basis, controls for systematic diﬀerences in trade size between
individual and institutional trades while the lagged dependent variable is added
as an independent variable to focus on the price impact of the current
transaction.
From the regression results (not reported), based on the signiﬁcantly higher
proportion of positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, and the relatively low
average standard error (compared to the average coeﬃcient estimate), the
positive and signiﬁcant impact of medium-size institutional trades is evident.
The impact of medium-size institutional trades on transaction-by-transaction
price changes is the most signiﬁcant of trades in all size categories.
In summary, stealth-tradingappears to be driven primarily by medium-size
trades initiated by institutions. This result holds even after controllingfor the
relatively larger medium-size institutional trades compared to medium-size
individual trades.
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In this section, we provide the results of two sensitivity analyses to ensure the
robustness of our main result.
4.1. Stealth-trading and ﬁrm size
Here, we investigate if stealth-trading is related to ﬁrm size. This sensitivity
analysis is motivated by the extant literature that documents the importance of
ﬁrm size in equity price dynamics. Bhusan (1989), Lo and MacKinlay (1990),
and Badrinath et al. (1995) provide a discussion of these dynamics.
Table 3
Distribution of transaction-by-transaction price change per unit volume
The table provides the mean and standard deviation of transaction-by-transaction stock price
change (in units of cents per 100 shares) for small (100–499 shares), medium (500–9,999 shares),
and large-size (10,000+share) trades originating from individuals and institutions. The medium-
trade size category is subdivided into four sub-categories of trade sizes. Additionally, the p-values
of a two-tailed test of equality of the mean price change for individual and institutional trades in
each trade size category are presented. The sample consists of 97 NYSE ﬁrms in the TORQ
database with signiﬁcant price increases between November 1, 1990 and January 31, 1991.






cents per 100 shares
Mean price change
(Std. Deviation)




Small (100–499 shares) 0.091 0.082 0.012
(0.044) (0.053)
Medium (500–9,999 shares)
500–999 shares 0.009 0.073 0.025
(0.022) (0.018)
1000–2,999 shares 0.007 0.042 0.007
(0.021) (0.008)
3,000–5,999 shares 0.006 0.018 0.069
(0.007) (0.002)
6,000–9,999 shares 0.004 0.01 0.071
(0.009) (0.002)
Large (10,000+shares) 0.019 0.006 0.019
(0.017) (0.000)
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subsample and the 30 smallest ﬁrms into a SMALL ﬁrm subsample. The
market value of each ﬁrm, as of October 31, 1990 is computed from the closing
stock price times the number of shares outstanding. Once again, the four sub-
partitions of medium-size trades are maintained to ensure that the average
individual and institutional trade trades are similar within each medium trade
size sub-partition.
We ﬁnd (not reported) the followingcharacteristics associated with LARGE
ﬁrms. Medium-size trades have a disproportionately large cumulative price
change associated with them (92%) relative to their proportion of all trades or
overall volume. Further, the bulk of the cumulative price change in medium-
size trades appears to originate from institutional trades (108% versus 19%
for medium-size individual trades). Also, within each medium trade size sub-
partition, institutional trades display signiﬁcantly higher cumulative price
change than the corresponding size individual trades.
For SMALL ﬁrms, even though medium-size trades display the highest
cumulative price change (103%), there also appears to be a proportional
relationship between cumulative price change and the corresponding volume.
Our statistical tests are unable to reject the tradingvolume hypothesis. Also,
the cumulative price impact of medium-size individual trades turns out to be
somewhat larger than medium-size institutional trades (58% and 45%,
respectively). And within each of the four sub-partitions of medium-size
trades, the cumulative price change associated with individual trades is greater
in all but one sub-partition. Thus, medium-size institutional trades in SMALL
ﬁrms appear, overall, to have a less dominant price impact role than those in
LARGE ﬁrms.
4.2. Stealth-trading in the TORQ universe
In another sensitivity check, we look for stealth-tradingin the universe of
TORQ stocks. Our approach is comparable to and Barclay et al. (1993) who
investigate and ﬁnd (relatively weaker) support for the stealth-trading
hypothesis in the universe of NYSE stocks in the 1981–1984 period.
Speciﬁcally, we use all valid observations in the audit ﬁle for the entire sample
of 144 stocks.
The upper panel of Table 4 reports the mean percentage of the cumulative
stock price change occurring on trades in each trade size category, the
correspondingnumber and percentag e of transactions, and transaction volume
and volume percentages for all TORQ stocks. We also provide, in the lower
panel of Table 4, numbers similar to Table 2 for small, medium, and large-size
trades initiated by individuals and institutions. Finally, as in Table 2, we
partition the medium-size trades into four sub-partitions to control for the
relatively larger institutional trades in the original medium trade size partition.
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Cumulative price change, trades, and volume by trade size and trader types for the universe of TORQ stocks
Trade sizes are classiﬁed as small (100–499 shares), medium (500–9,999 shares), and large (10,000+shares). Trades are further identiﬁed as initiating
from individuals or institutions. The medium trade size category is subdivided into four sub-categories of trade sizes. The table reports the (cross-
sectional) mean cumulative stock price change, the proportion of trades, and the proportion of share volume, by trade size and, further, by trade
initiator. The sample consists of all valid transactions in 144 NYSE ﬁrms in the TORQ database.
Trade size % of Cumulative price change Number of trades % of trades Volume % of volume
Small (100–499 shares) 13.31 90,321 41.02 17,852,700 3.41
Medium (500–9,999 shares) 65.46 117,617 53.42 240,022,400 45.84
Large (10,000+shares) 21.23 12,228 5.55 265,695,000 50.75
Trades initiated by individuals
Small (100–499 shares) 36.02 53,301 28.16 9,904,200 2.24
Medium (500–9,999 shares) 3.50 26,698 14.10 34,812,200 7.86
500–999 shares 2.175 18,547 9.798 13,218,900 2.986
1000–2,999 shares 6.141 6,158 3.253 11,565,800 2.612
3,000–5,999 shares 0.303 1,679 0.887 7,621,800 1.722
6,000–9,999 shares 0.772 314 0.166 2,405,700 0.543
Large (10,000+shares) 1.61 714 0.38 13,965,400 3.15
Trades initiated by institutions
Small (100–499 shares) 17.61 31,437 16.61 6,329,100 1.43
Medium (500–9,999 shares) 66.73 66,995 35.39 160,980,700 36.36
500–999 shares 31.322 27,079 14.305 20,857,400 4.711
1000–2,999 shares 8.183 22,048 11.648 45,247,300 10.220
3,000–5,999 shares 22.615 13,912 7.350 64,366,000 14.538
6,000–9,999 shares 4.606 3,956 2.090 30,510,000 6.891



























































4For transactions classiﬁed by trade size alone, medium-size trades cause the
highest cumulative price change at 65% and comprises 53% of the transactions
and 46% of the volume. Our statistical tests reject the alternatives of public
information and tradingvolume hypotheses. Also, the bulk of the cumulative
price change in medium-size trades appears to be driven by institutions.
Finally, within each of the four medium trade size sub-partitions, institutional
trades cause signiﬁcantly higher cumulative price change relative to individual
trades.
In summary, stealth-tradingappears to be present in transactions encom-
passingall stocks in the TORQ data – albeit not as dominantly as in our
sample of 97 stocks. Stealth-tradingalso appears to be driven by institutional
trades, even after controllingfor their relatively larg er trade sizes.
5. Conclusion
Usingaudit trail data for a sample of NYSE ﬁrms, we ﬁrst show that
medium-size trades are associated with the largest cumulative stock price
change – a result consistent with the stealth-trading hypothesis. Next, we
ﬁnd that the source of the disproportionately large cumulative price impact
(relative to the proportion of trades and volume) of medium-size trades is
almost entirely due to those initiated by institutions. This result holds even
after controllingfor the relatively larg er (medium-size) institutional trades
compared to individual trades in the same trade size category. Finally,
the signiﬁcantly large contribution of medium-size institutional trades to
the overall cumulative price impact of medium-size trades is also evident in
the universe of TORQ stocks. The evidence, however, is relatively stronger in
large ﬁrms.
In conclusion, through a careful empirical design and a detailed data set we
provide a glimpse into the complex world of strategic traders and the price
impact of their trades. But informed (or strategic) traders can use a variety of
other ways to disguise their trades. Some possible avenues include hiding
behind liquidity trades and fragmenting orders across exchanges, across time,
and across stock and options markets. We leave it for future research to
consider some or all of these avenues of informed tradingin order to enhance
our understandingof stealth-tradingand its impact on stock prices.
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